We test the impact of religiosity and ownership structure on the risk profile of banks, which issued securitisation. We employ GMM estimation using unique database on asset securitization of 672 commercial banks (4889 year-observations) in 22 countries (from 2003-2012), which have dual banking system. We find that banks with higher securitisation activity have consistently shown a riskier profile by being significantly less adequately capitalised and offering higher ratio of net loans to total assets. Controlling for bank type (Islamic and conventional banks), we find that although Islamic banks, in general, show a conservative approach towards risk by keeping higher reserves and more liquidity, banks involved in new issuance of asset securitization as still exposed to a higher risk profile . Controlling for a country religiosity shows different risk profile of banks in countries with different religiosity thresholds. Controlling for different types of bank ownership highlights an additional exposure to credit risk in addition to capital adequacy and liquidity risks. Our results emphasize the importance of identifying the impact of bank type and the religiosity / culture factors in global banking studies. Our results are of importance to both local and international regulators as well as different stakeholders in banks.
Introduction:
Over the last two decades and until the financial crisis of 2008, securitization 2 has gained momentum reaching volumes of $10.24 trillion in the United States and $2.25 trillion in Europe as of the 2nd quarter of 2008. Prior literature has indicated multiple benefits of securitization for both issuers and investors, such as lower capital requirements, efficient transfer of risks, improved performance, liquidity and credit ratings (Alkhan, 2006; Jobst, 2007; AbdulAziz and Gintzburger, 2009; Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012; Lemmon et al. 2014) . However, prior literature has also indicated negative effects such as reduced incentives to appropriately screen borrowers (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Keys et al. 2010 ), incentives to securitize low quality assets (Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace, 2009) , and increased impediments to renegotiating distress loans (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, 2010) . Additionally, critics suggest that the inherent complexity and limited monitoring ability of this method lead to a major decline in underwriting standards which brought about the severe subprime crisis, the beginning of a bitter financial crisis (Kiff and Kisser, 2014) . Since then, there has been much questioning of the effectiveness of such innovative tools on several dimensions (Wilson, 2009) . Therefore, it became a crucial contemporary issue in the research of financial institutions and markets to foster the understanding of banks' securitization activities and their impact on bank risk, identifying financial system implications.
Major international conventional banks have been weakened by the 2008 global financial crisis. Since then, there has been much questioning of the effectiveness of such innovative tools (Wilson, 2009 ).
Although Islamic financial institutions have not emerged from the 2008 financial crisis intact, Islamic banks were less adversely affected than their conventional counterparts (Chapra, 2009 ). It has also been argued that the constraints observed by the Islamic finance system could have provided a potential alternative to the conventional securitized products, which contributed to the crisis (Totaro, 2009) 3 .
2 Securitization is the financial practice of pooling types of contractual debt (or non-debt assets which generate receivables) and selling consolidated debt (or receivables) to third party investors as securities. The principal and interest on the debt, underlying the security, is paid back to the various investors regularly. Securitization has been applied mainly by financial institutions to expand their loan portfolios to offer new loans to lower income groups, accessible to subprime consumers (DeLorenzo, 2007; Totaro, 2009 ). In the United States the market for securitizations counted on two important assets; Asset backed securities (ABS) and Mortgage backed securities (MBS). Both types of debt contracts have played a crucial role in integrating securitization markets. MBS are securities created from the pooling of mortgages, which is then sold to investors. They have been developed by means of government-sponsored agencies (such as the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or Freddie Mac). The demand for these types of securities grew rapidly for institutional investors who were more willing to invest in credit risk (Bowden and Lorimer, 2009; Campbell et al., 2011; Casu et al. 2011) . These types of securities are prohibited in Islamic banks as it involves paying interest and the sale of debt. Bonin et al., 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Dinç, 2005; Acker and Athanassakos, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Claessens et al. 2001; Dages et al. 2000; Laeven, 1999; Pound, 1988) . Due to better bailout guarantees, government ownership induce higher risk-taking given the fact that capital regulation restraint the lending ability, which eventually help them to enhance liquidity (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2007; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Brown and Dinc, 2011; Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi, 2013; and Dong et al. 2014) . Berger et al. (2005) and Iannota et al. (2007) also argue that banks with higher government ownership have higher default risk and hence, they anticipate poorer loan quality. However, Acker and Athanassakos (2003) stress that institutional investors (financial institutions and corporations) have a diversified portfolio of investments and they may have lower incentives to exercise control. Contrary to previous findings, Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) argue that institutional investors impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes.
The increasing volume of securitization activity in both banking sectors before the financial crisis raised the concerns of researchers, as well as those of investors and regulators over the potential for an increase in bank risk. Proponents argued that banks with constrained banking model were better shielded than their conventional counterparts from the impact of the financial crisis (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2009; Ahmad, 2010) due to the constraints imposed on their activity securitisation process. Such claims need to be empirically tested both pre and post the financial crises identifying the impact of important institutional and cultural factors, religiosity and ownership 5 , given that the other counter claims that many Islamic banking products mimic (i.e. Murabahah) their conventional counterparts. In particular, this research investigates whether controlling for different religiosity indicators alongside block ownerships for banks involved in new issuance of asset securitization would promote lower risk and better capital adequacy on average and during periods of financial distress While empirical work has been undertaken in providing cross-country evidence on the relative financial stability of CBs and IBs (see Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Abedifar et al. 2012; , these tests cover certain aspects of the bank performance including the business model, efficiency and asset quality. However, none of the studies, to the best of our knowledge, has tested the impact of asset securitizations activity on bank risk for both banking sectors. An additional contribution of this study includes identifying the imperative impacts of the cultural and institutional factors on both banking industries' asset securitization activities, showing their significant impact on banks' risk taking behaviour Our study updates the existing evidence on asset securitization by employing unique and comprehensive data for global asset securitization.
. Tests compare between banks involved in asset securitizations (representing constrained Islamic asset securitization as well as CBs) versus banks that do not issue asset securitization in 22 countries. Empirical tests employ the two-step GMM estimation for the panel data of 672 global banks (4889 yearobservations) for the pooled sample period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . We believe that both constraints imposed on Islamic Finance product structures as well as the crises period provide a unique setting for our testing for both types of banks; given that bankers are more likely to deviate from accounting standards and regulatory requirements during periods of financial distress (Hofmann, 2012) . . We use accounting-based information to identify measures which capture each of (a) capital adequacy (Capital adequacy ratio hereafter, CAR) (b) credit risk (non-performing loans to gross loans and loan loss reserves to gross loans ratios) and (c) liquidity management risk (liquid assets total deposit and borrowings and net loans to total assets ratios). Two proxies are employed for religiosity. The first is bank type (Islamic or conventional) and the second is country religiosity (the ratio of Muslim population to total population). Testing for the ownership hypothesis analyses for the bank's largest block owner (holding 10% or more) for of each type of bank ownership (Financial institution, corporate, family, government and foreign). Our results show that on average banks with higher securitisation activity have low capital adequacy ratio and higher net loans to total assets indicating poor liquidity position. Controlling for the financial crisis period (2008-2009), we find consistent negative association between securitisation activity and both CAR and net loans to total assets indicating that banks with higher securitisation activity persistently report poor capital adequacy and a higher liquidity risk. Securitization activity is negatively associated with capital adequacy and positivity associated with liquidity risk (net loans to total deposits ratio) after controlling for both religiosity proxies.
Examining the risk profile of banks with high securitisation activity comparing Muslim majority countries and Non-Muslim majority countries. Tests within Muslim majority country indicate that bank securitization activity are involved in lower credit risk (lower loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio). No significant association was found with capital adequacy or liquidity risks. However, within the subsample of non-Muslim majority countries, banks with higher securitization activity have significantly lower capital adequacy and significantly higher liquidity risk (net loans to total assets ratio), implying a different risk profile for countries with higher concentration of Muslim majority. In line with predictions, IBs reported a more conservative approach by keeping higher loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio and higher ratio of liquid assets to total deposit ratios, as compared to their conventional counterparts. These findings are consistent with prior studies claims (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2009; Ahmed, 2010) that IBs appear to have a more prudent approach as compared with their conventional counterparts by holding a significantly higher reserves ratio for impaired assets. These overall, findings imply that the risk exposure of banks with higher securitization activity in the pooled sample is driven by risk profile of securitised banks in non-Muslim majority countries. These findings also previous research which has emphasised on how religiosity is an important determinant in financial decisions and how it mitigates risk (Maltby, 1999; Waite and Lehrer, 2003; and Lehrer, 2004; Hilary and Hu, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012) .
Testing for the second hypothesis related to the impact of ownership structure on bank risk, we find that banks with higher securitisation activity have consistently shown lower capital adequacy and higher liquidity ratio. Controlling for the largest block for financial institutions ownership, highlighted an additional type of risk which is credit risk as shown by the significantly low loan loss reserves to gross loans. However, specific inferences are drawn from additional sub-sampling analyses for each type of ownership indicating changed risk profile for banks with new issuance of asset securitizations. Our results highlight the importance of identifying the impact of both culture factors, such as religiosity, and ownership type in global banking studies. (e.g. Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al., 2014) .
The next section discusses the study background followed by hypotheses development in section 3. The methodology and data are covered in sections 4 and 5 respectively followed by the results and conclusion in sections 6 and 7.
Background:
Conventional asset securitization reflects a flexible structured finance technique of liquidity, which involves risk transfer and the conversions of present or future asset claims of varying maturity and quality into tradable debt securities (DeLorenzo, 2007; Totaro, 2009) . In a typical transaction, the originating bank transfers a pool of financial assets with fixed or nearly fixed cash flows to an SPV. This represents a legal entity that in turn finances the purchase through the issuance of securities backed by the pool. These securities must also be grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by an accredited credit rating agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon payments. (Bowden and Lorimer, 2009 ).
Conventional securitization has become popular for some reasons, among them are; first, it allowed financial institutions to have a direct and quick alternative to access the capital markets (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007) . Second, securitization provides more diversified product portfolios for large institutional investors. Third, securitization enables banks to better satisfy capital adequacy requirements by Basel II, through a preoccupation transfer of liabilities to become an off-balance item. Hence, banks can circumvent the adequacy capital ratio imposed by Basel, which limited the size of outstanding loans vis-avis equity capital (Aalbers et al., 2011) .
With the financial crisis in 2008 being originated from the US subprime and extended worldwide, the world had a housing boom which led to financial turmoil in the United States and many other countries (Taylor, 2009) . Dissipating of liquidity has been caused by the consecutive contamination of the different classes of financing products in the credit market alongside the freezing of non-government credit markets, such as commercial papers and bonds (Kiff and Kisser, 2010) . The inflated capital costs led to the occurrence of the credit crisis and to the failure of financial institutions with poor credit profiles and a weak liquidity position. Both the large injection of money from banks into the mortgage bond market as well as the high volume of lending practices by the mortgage brokers, banks and others accelerated the subprime crisis. This in fact has exposed the global banking system to high vulnerability to both insolvency and credit risks. Economists have asserted that the crisis revealed the weaknesses of conventional finance to mitigate exogenous finance shocks (Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010; Alasrag, 2010) .
Rising competition and continuing efforts to provide innovative products have together contributed to a growing interest in Islamic banking. IBs as religious-oriented type of banks enjoy a higher trust premium in predominantly Muslim countries like Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In the economic realm, for instance, Islamic religion plays a catalytic role in shaping risk taking for financial institutions. This is justifies by the principles of assuring the economic well-being of the whole community protecting minorities as well as equitable distribution of wealth (Slahudin, 2008) .
Moreover, financial practices and accompanying legal instruments are affected by Shariah compliant finance framework which conforms to Islamic law (Elasrag, 2014; Lewis, 2005) .
As such, in principle, Islamic banking differs significantly from conventional finance, given the prohibition both of interest and speculation, in addition to the assumed dominance of the profit and risk sharing principle. These in fact are likely to pose substantial differences with respect to product and activity structures between IBs and CBs. In line with the imperative claims made about the added protection for Islamic finance against excessive risk-taking, the Islamic banking sector attracted more attention during and after the financial crisis. The peculiar nature of IBs that all financial transactions, must be either trade-based or asset-linked in addition to the extra governance layer (Shariah supervisory board), encourage more resilience in the system (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2010) . Islamic banking contractual arrangements are likely to bring greater scrutiny and stricter oversight by depositors and investors alike. Hence, Islamic banking does not allow the provision of credit to subprime borrowers (Desai, 2008) .
Comparative studies between IBs and CBs, on bases of general banking system and product structures, provide mixed results. While Yudistira (2003) find that IBs suffered from inefficiencies during , Iqbal (2001 , Hussein (2004) and Siddiqui (2008) found that IBs outperformed their conventional counterparts using different performance measures and different research methodologies.
This was clearer during the recent global financial crisis of (Khamis et al., 2010 Hassan and Dridi, 2010) . On the other hand, Čihák and Hesse, (2010) report that small IBs tend to be financially stronger than small commercial banks, while large commercial banks tend to be financially stronger than large IBs.
They also show that small IBs tend to be financially stronger than large IBs. Abedifar et al. (2012) find no significant difference between the two banking sectors, with respect to the insolvency risk. Their finding on credit risk is mixed, varying according to which proxy for credit risk is used. show insignificant differences between IBs and CBs in their business orientation. However, they find that IBs are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. They find no significant evidence for the financial stability of both IBs and CBs during the recent financial crisis. (2000), credit risk for the issuer improves if the riskiness of the securities sold to investors is higher than that of the issuer prior to the securitization. However, it might be the case that the transaction intensifies the issuer's net exposure to the default risk of its assets. Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) With the above extant evidence suggesting that banks securitize their riskier loans while retaining safer ones on their balance sheets, religiosity tend to operate as an important cultural control mechanism which has an impact on financial reporting and risk (Callen and Fang 2013) . A well-established branch of literature has identified impact of religiosity on corporate economic attitudes (Barro and McCleary 2003, Stulz and Williamson 2003) . On the other hand, the constrained model of Islamic securitisation might expose them to specific types of risks such as liquidity. Managing liquidity is more challenging in IBs than CBs given the limited capacity of IBs to attract Shariah compliant instruments (since the returns on these accounts are uncertain) alongside the expected high operational costs and lower profitability under debtbased contract arrangements . indicate that IBs recently operate within new and unfamiliar structures of finance which tend to cause long-term liquidity challenges. They suggest that IBs should hold more cash relative to deposits than conventional banks due to the high risk of deposits withdrawal by existing clients.
Both the religiosity orientations as well as the extra layer of governance (Shariah supervisory board), drive expectations for IBs to be more conservative and lower risk taking (Lewis, 2005) 6. Islamic finance principles are based on the concepts of equality and justice in communities through financing real economic activities (Ahmed, 1991) . These concepts represent the base of a comprehensive framework for financial reporting and risk taking (Baydoun and Willett, 1994; Lewis, 2001 ). In addition, the assetbacking model is one of the fundamental criterion in IBs since all contracts must be attached to the nature of the contracts and should be based on real economic activities (Jobst, 2007) . In this regard, Shari'ah in IBs primarily prohibits arbitrage in transactions through requiring a clear link between assets and securitization transactions (Bashir, 1999) and hence, IBs have restricted access to market sources to meet liquidity requirements, which are relatively more expensive due to the Shariah compliance condition.
Therefore, predictions reflect a negative association between risk taking and religiosity which is expected to have a direct influence for risk taking for banks issuing asset securitizations.
Further, compliance with Basel II requirements for capitalization by IBs since December 2005 implies that the composition of eligible capital and risk weighted assets is strictly determined by the nature of the market and credit risk for IBs (IFSB, 2005) 7 . With the relative short history of Islamic banking and the small niche in many countries for Sukuk issuance, IBs is expected to be better capitalised than securitized (SEC) in CBs. This is attributable to their limited access to market resources to cover unexpected losses and their needs to protect investment accountholders and depositors' wealth alongside the need to comply with strict capital adequacy requirements of Basel II 8 . he existing literature comparing IBs and CBs also provide evidence that IBs are better capitalized than CBs . Particularly, Iqbal (2001) demonstrates that IBs are well capitalized and make effective use of the resources at their disposal.
Nevertheless, Ariss (2010) argues that IBs are better capitalized and hold significantly higher equity to assets ratios than CBs.
6 Islamic banks (IBs) must adhere to both regulations set by regulators as well as the principles of Shariah (Archer et al. 1998) . The purpose of Shariah compliant finance is to shape financial practices and accompanying legal instruments that conform to Islamic law (Elasrag, 2014) . Shariah prohibits interest and speculation and it calls for alternative modes of trading where the underlying products are real assets or services. Capital providers including investors are usually concerned that their funds should be invested in a Shariah compliant manner (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) . 7 The capital adequacy standard for IBs addresses the different risks faced by this sector, and assigns a different set of risk weights to different Islamic financing modes.
IBs are predominantly viewed as risk-averse institutions (Mills and Presley, 1999; Zaher and Hassan, 2001; and Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005) and are likely to entail lower credit risk, and thus to deliver better asset quality than CBs. This may be attributable to the added corporate governance layer of the Shari'ah Supervisory Board (SSB) in Islamic banking system. The restricted contractual arrangements and the rigorous governance supervision are associated with lower risk in IBs and lower level of adverse selection and/or moral hazard (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005; . Khan (2010a) also stresses that IBs have a higher deposit base and lower credit defaults. In addition, Abedifar et al. (2012) demonstrate that IBs are characterized by lower credit risk than CBs.
Further, managing liquidity is more challenging in IBs than CBs given the limited capacity of IBs to attract Shariah compliant instruments . Accordingly,, we conjecture that religiosity in general terms will positively affect the credit profile and risk taking behaviour in banks involves in new issuances of asset securitization. The religiosity factor exposes banks, in principle, to better capitalization and lower risk taking . This leads us to the first hypothesis stated in the alternative form:.
Hypothesis 2: Bank Ownership, Capital Regulation, Risk-taking, and Liquidity:
Agency problem related to separation of ownership and control is come to spotlight while bank type is the prime issue of discussion. Theoretically, publicly held banks ensure greater dispersion of ownership, which enhance separation between shareholder and manager and increase information asymmetry and consequently create divergence in incentives, whereas privately held banks drive less separation between shareholder and manager and hence, their incentive are closely aligned to those of shareholders (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001 ). However, the incentive mechanism is seen different in nationalized and state-owned banks. Particularly, political or social mission drives incentive mechanism in nationalized and state-owned banks (Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi, 2013) . In addition, the ownership and control either in foreign or domestic banks implies differences in terms of market discipline and their access to capital markets. Market discipline is one of the three pillars in Basel accord, along with capital regulation and banking supervision. Thus, market discipline plays an important role on bank type, which is considered as a useful instrument to enhance banking supervision or to mitigate shareholders' risk-taking incentives. Nevertheless, given the fact that the market is expected to monitor and/or influence banks' risk behavior, and therefore, the impact of ownership changes on risk cannot be assessed without considering incentives driven by financial markets in terms of discipline (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001 ).
Further, private or family ownership might have different objectives in terms of growth and risk-return strategies. Private equity is less liquid than other ownership type (e.g. public), which restraint their faster growth opportunities and more risk-taking. Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) demonstrate that a higher equity stake of either individuals/ families is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. However, Laeven (1999) has quite opposite findings. He finds that family-owned banks were among the most risky banks. The empirical evidence on foreign ownership is mixed. Laeven (1999) finds foreignowned banks took little risk relative to other banks. But Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) indicate that foreign ownership is associated with greater risk-taking and consequently less financial stability. One the other hand, Lee and Hsieh (2014) offer a U-shaped relation between foreign ownership and stability is supported. But, Dages et al. (2000) document that foreign ownership appear to contribute to greater stability since it is considered as a key good governance.
H2: The ownership structure of banks positively affect their risk-taking behaviour and capital adequacy.
Data and Model:
We employ an unbalanced panel dataset and a country variable criterion, reflecting countries with at least four banks and having at least two observations for each bank, following . The description of the sample is included in Table 1 . This Table reports the sample composition by country and bank type. We find that banks with SEC represent 14% of the total sample composition. For IBs, the highest concentration of SEC banks is located in Malaysia, UAE, and Bahrain.
Insert Table 1 about here

Measures of endogenous variables
We include three measures of endogenous variables for capitalization, credit risk and liquidity. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and , we employ bank capital adequacy measure, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), calculated as (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/total Risk weighted assets. CAR reflects the legal regulatory requirements for capitalization that measures adequacy level and buffers maintained (Fonseca and González, 2010; Buch and Prieto, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014) . Following prior literature we measure credit risk by loan loss reserves to gross loans and non-performing loans to gross loans ratios (Gonzalezet al., 2005; Lepetit et al., 2008; Abedifar et al., 2013; 10 . The loan loss reserve represents an estimate of credit losses inherent in a bank's loan portfolio. Finally, the liquidity indicator reflects a bank's ability to repay short-term obligations. We use the liquid assets to total deposits and borrowings ratio, as well as the net loans to total assets ratio to measure bank liquidity management .
Measures of Explanatory Variables:
The key explanatory variable in this study is asset securitization activity. This variable is measured as the total securitization for bank i at time t issuance deflated by total assets (Barth et al., Casu et al., 2011) Following prior literature (Dusuki and Mokhtar, 2008; AAOIFI, 2008; Casu et al. 2011; Campbell et al., 2011) , we restrict the definition of asset securitization to represent banks involved only in a first-year issuance, either through SPV or the bank itself, for asset securitization (Sukuk vs. conventional securities) backed by underlying assets. We find that sukuk issuance is referred to as asset securitization in Islamic banking, and IBs usually use the two terms interchangeably to report about their securitization process.
Additional criteria for Islamic securitization include a non-conditional sukuk asset structure that involves a separate issuance at market price (AAOIFI, 2008) . We control for two religiosity indicators (1) a bank type indicator dummy (IBs) equal 1 if it is an Islamic bank and 0 if it a conventional bank (2) the ratio of Muslim population to the total population of a country. We used five ownership ratios (Financial institution, corporate, family, government and foreign) all expressed as total shares owned to the total disclosed shares. The financial institutions ratio includes all shareholders classified by either ORBIS or Zawya as financial institutions, mutual funds, Insurance companies; Banks etc. Corporate ownership ratio includes all firms that are not part of financial institutions or private owners. Family ownership ratio includes individual shareholders or their families. Also in this category fall privately owned firms, in other words firms that are wholly owned by ether a single private investor or a group of private investors.
We control for size using the natural logarithm of total bank assets. Size accounts for big banks that might have smaller capital buffers and hence, are more risky, which according to the ''too-big-to-fail" hypothesis suggests that large banks will receive regulatory support during financial distress, or when they have lower risk as a consequence of the enhanced diversification of their asset portfolio Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010; Fonseca and González, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; . We control for bank age to proxy bank's capability and informational advantages to control for risks (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998) . We also consider the bank's non-interest income as an indicator for the bank inefficiency. An increase in the share of non-interest income in total operating income is expected to lower bank financial performance and stability, since an increased reliance on non-interest income raises the volatility of bank loan portfolios without a direct link to increased profits (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh 2010) . Banks with a high share of non-operating income have high insolvency risk (Lepetit et al., 2008) . We also include equity to total assets as an independent variable in both the credit risk and insolvency models to control for leverage.
We control for a set of macroeconomic variables including market power through a proxy for the market share of deposits measures, as the total banks deposits over total banking sector deposits (Berger, 1995; Hasan et al., 2013) . We also control for country governance factors including the rule of law and regulatory quality as intuitional measures for the both the enforcement mechanisms and legal systems (La Porta et al. 1997; Djankov et al., 2007; Fang et al. 2014) . The country's prevailing inflation rate is included, and the growth in the prosperity of the population is also controlled for by including the growth in GDP per capita (Fang et al. 2014; Mili et al. 2014 ). According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) bank crises are more prevalent in countries having low GDP growth, and high inflation and real interest rates. In periods with high economic growth, demands on loans and financial services provided by both IBs and CBs are likely to increase. This is expected to increase bank cash flow, interest earnings and profits. As our study period falls within the crisis, we predict the growth variable, GDP to be a negative determinant of bank performance (Subramanian et al., 2013) . Regarding the inflation variable, in conventional banking high inflation rates should lead to higher loan rates which in turn would lead to higher revenues (Bashir, 2000; Haron, 2004) . As for IBs, inflation is likely to be positively associated with performance only, if a large portion of IBs profits accrues from debt-based contracts (i.e. Murabaha) (Subramanian et al., 2013) . In our study, with the assumption that Islamic banking is currently mostly based on debt rather than equity-based contracts, we expect inflation to have a positive effect on IB performance. In addition, because IBs are prohibited from charging fixed interest rates, profitability is likely to be positively associated with the domestic inflation rate.
Empirical models and estimation methods:
Our main models are developed as follows:
CAP i,t = β 0 + β 1 CAP i,t−1 + β 2 SEC i,t + β 3 IBs i + β 4 SIZE it + β 7 AGE it + β 8 NON INT it + + β 9 MACRO i,j,t + ε i,t … . (1) CR i,t = β 0 + β 1 CR i,t−1 + β 2 SEC i,t + β 3 IBs i + β 4 SIZE it + β 7 AGE it + β 8 NON_INT it + + β 9 MACRO i,j,t + ε i,t … . . (2) LIQ i,t = β 0 + β 1 LIQ i,t−1 + β 2 SEC i,t + β 3 IBs i + β 4 SIZE it + β 7 AGE it + β 8 NON_INT it + + β 9 MACRO i,j,t + ε i,t … … . . SEC i,t = asset securitization activity measured as the total securitization for bank i at time t issuance deflated by total assets at time t.
IBs i = Dummy variable equal 1 for an IB and 0 for CB.
Size i,t = Natural logarithm of the total bank assets for bank i at time t.
AGE it = Age of bank i at time t since the year of its establishment, NON_INT it = Total Non-Interest Operating Income for bank i at time t, MACRO i,j,t = A set of Country level macroeconomic variables for country j at time t, ε it = White-noise error term. 4
The definition of variables is included in Table 2 .
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Estimation method:
We employ a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, developed for dynamic models of panel data to examine the impact of bank asset securitization on the capitalization, credit risk and liquidity of both IBs and CBs. This model is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and has been modified by Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998). The model incorporates both difference GMM and system GMM. The in-difference GMM takes the first-difference equation to eliminate the country-specific effects, through using lagged level of dependent variable as instruments. To overcome the problem of weak instruments, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed system GMM to combine the level regression and difference equations, using lagged differences as instruments. Therefore, this two-step estimator functions efficiently to control for timeinvariant fixed effects, which we eliminate by taking first-differences of all variables, and the autoregressive process in the data for each financial performance indicator. We include lagged dependent variables model to capture the dynamic nature of these variables and the potential presence of endogeneity of the explanatory variables, using instrumental variables based on three period lagged values of the explanatory variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . We checked the model specification using Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. We also employ the Arellano and Bond's test for zero autocorrelation which determines if the first differenced residuals are free from second order serial correlation. The existing studies in banking research employ similar approach (e.g. Fonseca and González, 2010; Wintoki et al. 2012; and Flannery and Hankins, 2013) . Using GMM estimations, 11 Models are specified and separately estimated using the above mentioned risk indicators.
Descriptive Statistics:
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our data. We report the descriptive statistics for full sample in Panel A, IBs sub-sample in Panel B and CBs sub-sample in Panel C. Table 3 shows statistics for banks involved in asset securitization activity, both SEC IBs sub-sample (Panel A) and SEC CBs sub-sample (Panel B). SEC IBs appear to be more adequately capitalized than SEC CBs, with higher average for both CAR and EtoTA CBs. Ratios for asset quality indicate poorer quality for SEC IBs as compared to SEC CBs, implying higher credit risk though the results show more prudence by SEC IBs holding more loan loss reserves to gross loans as a safety cushion against expected risk. SEC IBs report a higher average of operational efficiency than SEC CBs; with lower means for both the costs to income ratio and overheads to total assets ratio. Comparison on the basis of earnings ability shows that SEC IBs have higher ROAA and higher ROAE, on average, than SEC CBs. SEC IBs report higher liquidity management with higher mean (median) for the liquid assets/total deposits and borrowing ratio as well as higher net loans to total assets ratio than SEC CBs. On average, SEC IBs are smaller in size, younger and appear to be less vulnerable to insolvency risk (lower mean for non-interest income) as compared to SEC CBs.
Empirical Results and Robustness Checks:
In this section we present the results of testing the impact of securitisation activity on bank risk on average and during the financial crisis. We then present the results of testing the impact of religiosity and ownership type on the risk profile of banks with high securitisation
Securitisation Activity and Bank Risk
We start the analysis by examining the impact of asset securitization activity (ratio of bank securitised assets to total assets) on bank risk (capital adequacy as well as credit and liquidity risks). The analysis (Table 4) shows that on average banks with higher securitisation activity have low capital adequacy ratio and higher net loans to total assets indicating poor liquidity position. These results support prior claims and are consistent with predictions that securitization activity is positively associated with more risk taking. This initial analysis indicates that in our sample (countries with dual banking systems), securitisation activity, on average, has not helped banks to manage their liquidity or their capital adequacy.
We then control for the financial crisis period (2008) (2009) , to explore changes in these banks risk exposure during the crisis. As shown in (Table 5) , we find that the negative association between securitisation activity and capital adequacy continues during the crisis implying that banks with higher securitisation activity persistently scored low in capital adequacy during the whole period of study.
Additionally, the results showed a significant negative association between higher securitisation activity and net loans to total assets implying a higher liquidity risk. These results indicate, consistent with predictions that banks involved in higher asset securitization activity exhibit higher risk. Our findings conform to results presented in previous studies (Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003; Uzun and Webb, 2007; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008; Altunbas et al. 2009; Cardone-Riportella et al. 2010; Casu et al. 2011; and Barth et al. 2012) .
Testing the impact of religiosity on securitised banks' risk
As explained earlier, Islamic banks, as religiously oriented institutions, are expected to be more conservative when dealing with risk. On the other hand, their constrained model of securitisation might expose them to specific types of risks such as liquidity. Under this set of analyses we further test the impact of bank type on securitised banks' risk profile in countries with a dual banking system (Islamic and conventional banks) using two proxies for religiosity. The first is bank type (Islamic or conventional) and the second is country religiosity (the ratio of Muslim population to total population).
Controlling for bank type (Table 6) , we find that banks with higher securitisation activity have significantly lower capital adequacy and offer higher ratio of net loans to total assets confirming their higher risk exposure. On the other hand, Islamic banks showed, as expected, a more conservative approach by keeping higher loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio and higher ratio of liquid assets to total deposit ratios, as compared to their conventional counterparts. Our findings provide additional empirical evidence to that presented to by Čihák and Hesse, 2010) Hasan and Dridi (2010); Abedifar et al. (2013) and to support prior studies' claims (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2009; Ahmed, 2010) , on the conservative behaviour and resilience of Islamic banks in general.
Additional tests are constructed for the impact of religiosity on securitised banks' risk exposure, we control for the second religiosity proxy (the ratio of the Muslim population to the total population).
Results (Table 7) show a similar high-risk profile for banks with higher securitisation activity to the results of the pooled sample. Securitization activity is negatively associated with capital adequacy and positivity associated with liquidity risk (net loans to total deposits ratio) after controlling for both religiosity proxies.
These results are also consistent during the financial crisis (Table 8) .
We then conduct analyses examining the risk profile of banks with high securitisation activity within each of the subsamples of; Muslim majority countries and Non-Muslim majority countries. Tests within Muslim majority country indicate that bank securitization activity is marginally associated with lower loan loss reserve to gross loans ratio (Table 9 ) implying a lower credit risk. No significant association was found with capital adequacy or liquidity risks. We also find that Islamic banks continue in maintaining significantly higher ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans and marginally lower net loans to total assets, confirming their conservative risk profile as compared with their conventional counterparts. Further tests within the subsample of non-Muslim majority countries (Table 10 ), show that banks with higher securitization activity had significantly lower capital adequacy and significantly higher liquidity risk (net loans to total assets ratio), implying a similar risk profile of these banks to the profile of the pooled sample. In addition, we find in the subsample of non-majority Muslim countries, that the Islamic banks' dummy is no longer significant implying no significant difference between the risk profile of Islamic and conventional banks in non-Muslin majority countries.
In summary, these particular set of tests show that the risk exposure of banks with higher securitization activity in the pooled sample is driven by the risk exposure of securitised banks in nonMuslim majority countries. Our results highlight the importance of identifying the impact of culture factors (such as religiosity) in global banking studies. (e.g. Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al., 2014) .
Testing the impact of ownership type on securitised Banks' risk
Testing for the second hypothesis related to the impact of ownership structure on bank risk, we test the impact of various types of bank ownerships and also conduct additional analyses within the subsamples of each type of bank ownership (Financial institution, corporate, private employee, government and foreign). Due to possible collinearity between various types of ownership, we run separate models for each type of ownership. The various models for the ownership are presented in Tables 10, 11 , 12, 13 and 14 11 . Results, in the three tables show that those banks with higher securitisation activity have consistently shown lower capital adequacy and higher liquidity ratio (higher ratio of net loans to total assets). In addition, controlling for bank financial institutions ownership, in the pooled sample, highlighted an additional type of risk that these banks faced which is credit risk as shown by the significantly low loan loss reserves to gross loans. The Islamic banks conservative risk profile has not changed in these models from the previous results.
For further insights on the impact of ownership on securitised banks risk profile we clustered our sample according to the bank's largest block owner (holding 10% or more). We then conduct the analysis within each subsample. Testing, in Table 15 , within the subsample of the largest block of financial institutions ownership, results show that banks with higher securitization activity report higher liquid assets to total deposits ratio and have lower net loans to total assets ratio, implying better liquidity position. No evidence on capital adequacy was found. IBs show a marginal positive evidence for loan loss reserve to gross loans ratio. Table 16 , shows the results of tests within the subsample of the largest block corporate ownership. We find banks with higher securitization activity have significantly higher capital adequacy with no evidence for other risk indicators while Islamic banks report lower capital adequacy. These results are also similar to tests (Table 17) within the subsample of majority of family ownership. However, within this subsample Islamic banks report significantly positive loan loss reserve to gross loans implying the robustness of their conservative risk behaviour.
Tests within the majority of employee ownership show no significant evidence for bank asset securitization. Tests within the subsample with of the largest block of government ownership (Table 18) indicate that banks with higher securitization activity show poor capital adequacy as well as weak liquidity position given the high net loans to total asset ratio. IBs report significantly high non-performing loans to gross loans and higher loan loss reserve to gross loans. The results imply a higher risk profile for securitised banks that are majority government owned. In Table 19 , tests within majority of foreign ownership subsample show no significant evidence on bank securitization activity.
Our results further confirm the importance of identifying the impact of bank ownership structure on the risk profile of banks in global banking studies. 
Variables
Definitions 1. Capitalization Proxies: a) CARi,t b) EtoTAi,t a) Capital Adequacy Ratio. b) Equity to total asset ratio. The ratio of Muslim population in country j to the total population of the country. FINANi,t A ratio of all shareholders classified by either ORBIS or Zawya as financial institutions, mutual funds, Insurance companies; Banks etc. CORi,t A ratio includes all firms that are not part of financial institutions or private owners. FAMILYi,t A ratio of individual shareholders or their families. Also in this category fall privately owned firms, in other words firms that are wholly owned by ether a single private investor or a group of private investors. GOVi,t FORi,t Sizei,t Natural logarithm of the total bank assets for bank i at time t. AGEi,t Age of bank i at time t since the year of its establishment NON_INTi,t Total Non-Interest Operating Income scaled by Total Assets for bank i at time t Crisist Time Dummy equal 1 for the financial periods of 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise. MACROi,j,t A set of country level macroeconomic variables for bank i in country j at time t, MSDi,t Bank i deposits at time t over total banking sector deposits at time t ROLi,t
Credit Risk
Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence RQi,t Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development GDPGRi,t Growth in GDP per capita in country j at time t INFi,t Country-prevailing inflation rate for bank i in time t. 
